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The last decade has seen a proliferation of empirical studies that seek to understand how the cognitive system 
links voluntary motor actions with their perceptual effects. A view that has found considerable support in this 
research is the ideo-motor approach to action control which holds that actors select, initiate, and execute a 
movement by activating anticipatory codes of the movement‟s sensory effects We, first review the empirical 
evidence from different paradigms showing that effects of voluntary actions become anticipated during response 
production. In a second step we survey empirical data investigating the nature of the mechanisms that link 
voluntary motor actions with their intended and expected perceptual effects. We argue that the integration, or 
binding, of perceptual and motor codes occurs in action planning where features of intended effects are 
selectively bound to features of the actions that are selected to achieve these effects in the environment. As a 
final step we will summarize empirical findings that may elucidate the particular roles of effect-code activation in 





In the 1980s Wolfgang Prinz published a book (Prinz, 1983) and several papers (Prinz, 1984, 
 
1987, 1990; see also Prinz, 1997) that prepared the ground for an impressive body of 
empirical studies seeking to understand how humans plan and control voluntary actions (for a 
review, see Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). Prinz´s core contention was 
that perceived events and planned actions share a common representational domain (common 
coding approach to perception and action). His second contention was that actions are planned 
and controlled in terms of their effects – that is, that intentional actions are controlled by 
anticipatory representations of intended and expected action effects. 
The emphasis on action effects in action control echoes the ideomotor approaches of 
philosophical psychology in the 19
th 
century (Herbart, 1824; Lotze, 1852; Harless, 1861; 
Münsterberg, 1888; James, 1890). Basically, these early ideomotor theorists have focused on 
how consciousness can acquire and exert control over the human body (for overviews, see 
Prinz, 1987; Stock & Stock, 2004) and assumed that actions are represented in memory in 
terms of effect codes. Münsterberg (1888) and James (1890) considered the anticipation of an 
action goal, i.e. the anticipation of the desired effect, to be a necessary precondition for 
executing a particular action. Lotze (1852) stated that the anticipation of a movement goal 
will make the body realize what the mind intends to do. These early ideomotor approaches to 
action control, deeply rooted in the introspective tradition of theorizing, were almost 
forgotten, even officially discredited (Thorndike, 1913) during the heydays of behaviorism 
and information-processing theory (for overviews see Greenwald, 1970; Prinz, 1987). And 
yet, ideomotor concepts have seen a renaissance in the last two decades, and empirical 
evidence in their support is steadily increasing. 
The first attempts to verify experimentally the ideomotor principle were reported  by A. 
Greenwald in 1970 (Greenwald, 1970a, 1970b, 1970c). More recently, Hommel (1993) 
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investigated the impact of action effects on action control in a study on the Simon effect. This 
effect arises when stimuli and responses vary on overlapping spatial dimensions (Kornblum, 
Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990). In the Hommel (1993) study participants responded to low- and 
high-pitched tones by pressing a left- vs. right-hand key. The location of the tone was not 
relevant but tones appeared randomly to the left or right of the subject. Conditions like that 
are known to yield better performance (faster and less error-prone responses) if stimulus and 
response correspond, hence if the tone signaling the left response appears on the left or if the 
tone signaling the right response appears on the right side – this is the Simon effect (for an 
overview, see Lu & Proctor, 1995). The aim of the Hommel (1993) study was to show that 
changing the actor‟s action goal could modify the Simon effect. In two experimental groups, 
each key was connected to a light on the opposite side, so that pressing the left key caused a 
brief light flash on the right side and pressing the right key produced a flash on the left side. 
Although the two groups performed exactly the same task with identical stimulus-response 
and response-light mappings their instructions differed. One group of participants was 
instructed to press the left/right key in response to the low/high tone (key instruction), 
whereas the other group was instructed to flash the right/left light accordingly (light 
instruction). The idea was that persons with a key instruction would specify their action goals 
in terms of key location whereas they would specify their goals in terms of light location with 
a light instruction. As these locations were always opposite to each other, the Simon effect 
should be completely reversed: A left-side stimulus should facilitate left-hand key presses 
under key instruction but right-hand key presses under light instruction – simply because with 
light instruction the goal of a right-hand key press should be flashing a left-side light. In more 
general terms, the occurrence of the Simon effect should depend on the overlap between 
stimulus and intended action effect and not just on the overlap between stimulus and 
response. And this is what happened: While participants in the key group produced a typical 
 
Simon effect (i.e., better performance with stimulus-key correspondence) the light instruction 
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completely reversed the pattern of results (i.e., better performance with stimulus-light 
correspondence). Thus, the correspondence between stimulus and instructed goal determined 
the effect. 
These observations implicate that intentions and action goals or effects play an important role 
in the planning and control of actions. Obviously, the action‟s goal determines how responses 
are cognitively coded and represented. If it is “pressing a key” the response is coded in terms 
of the location of the key and/or the finger operating the key. If, however, it is “flashing a 
light” the very same response is coded in terms of the location of the light that the finger 
movement switches on. In other words, responses are coded in terms of the effects they are 
intended to produce (the action-effect principle). 
Further evidence supporting the action-effect principle comes from a study by Kunde, 
Hoffmann and Zellmann (2002). In Kunde et al.´s experiments participants performed a 
speeded choice-reaction task with four stimuli (colors) and four responses (key-presses). Two 
of the key-presses triggered the presentation of a low-pitched tone and the other two the 
presentation of a high-pitched tone. Shortly before a stimulus was displayed the required 
response was indicated by a cue. In 25% of the trials the cue was invalid, i.e., not the cued 
key-press was actually required but one of the three remaining key-presses. These invalid 
trials offered the opportunity to assess the effects of anticipated action effects on response 
preparation. In half of the trials, the actual key-press produced the same acoustic effect as the 
key-press being indicated by the cue, and in the other half of trials the key-press was coupled 
with the alternative auditory effect. The important finding was that after some practice an 
unexpected response was initiated faster when the required response shared its effect tone 
with the prepared response. 
Altogether, firstly these findings strongly indicate that planning an action must have involved 
the anticipation of action effects (i.e., the activation of action-effect codes) at some point in 
the process of action production. They, secondly, indicate that the ideomotor logic is by no 
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means restricted to body-related, proximal effects of a movement (feeling and seeing the 
finger moving to and touching a light switch when intending to switch the room light on) but 
also applies to more remote and external, distal effects of a movement (seeing the room 
illuminated after operating the light switch). This opened the door for a wide range of 
empirical investigations, simply because external, remote effects can be much better 
experimentally manipulated than proximal, body-related effects. 
 
Action effects are part of the mental representation of actions 
 
 
There is now ample further evidence showing that action effects or action goals that, by 
definition, can only be attained after an action has been executed are involved before action 
execution starts. Two complementary research strategies have been chosen to establish the 
claim that action effects actually play a role in the mental representation of the action itself. 
The first strategy has been to show that responding is facilitated when the effect of a to-be- 
executed response is presented during action planning, and the second has been to show that 
action planning is facilitated if there is an overlap between features of the response and 
features of the effect. 
Following the first strategy, participants are usually confronted with novel, action-contingent 
events (action effects) in an acquisition phase with the expectation that this leads to an 
integration of effect and action codes. To diagnose the hypothesized action-effect binding, in 
a later phase of the experiment effect-related stimuli are presented prior to action execution. 
The critical question then is whether or not effect-related events presented while producing 
the response to the action-demanding stimulus would have an impact on action planning. 
Generally, the answer to this question is positive. For instance, in Hommel‟s (1996) 
experiments, participants first learned that their responses (different key-presses) would 
produce different effects (high and low pitched tones). Later they responded to visual stimuli 
with the key-presses. Together with each visual stimulus, one of the response effects was 
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presented. Responses were faster if the presented effect was the effect of the required 
response. The results were interpreted as evidence for an integration of the motor pattern 
representing a certain movement and the cognitive pattern representing the effects of that 
movement in the environment. 
Action-effect learning seems to be a rather general phenomenon, as effective learning has 
been demonstrated not only for auditory stimuli but also for visual letters that, unlike acoustic 
events, can easily be ignored (e.g. simply by looking away, closing one‟s eyes, and so forth). 
Ziessler and Nattkemper (2002) adapted the flanker paradigm introduced by Eriksen and 
Eriksen (1974) to investigate the involvement of effect codes in the preparation of a motor 
response. In the experiments participants first learned that their responses to stimulus letters 
were followed by the presentation of a new letter on the screen. The new letter was presented 
contingent to the response, i.e. as a response effect. To diagnose the hypothesized action- 
effect binding, the stimulus letters were presented together with the effect-related letters in the 
second phase of the experiments. The effect-related letters or new letters flanked the stimulus 
letter on both sides. If the flanking letters were the effects of the correct response this was 
considered as the effect-compatible condition. Effects of other responses as flanking letters 
resulted in the effect-incompatible condition, new letters in the neutral condition. 
Figure 1 
 
What was observed was that compared to the effect-incompatible and neutral conditions 
responding was faster under the effect-compatible condition (c.f. Fig. 1). To explain these 
findings, Ziessler and Nattkemper (2002) assumed that response preparation involves the 
anticipation of the response effects. In the effect-compatible condition the same effect codes 
are activated by the anticipation process as well as by external stimulation. This might 
facilitate response planning, which, in turn, results in shorter response times. 
Similar observations have been reported for visual locations (Hommel 1993), words 
 
(Hommel, Alonso, & Fuentes, 2003), and the affective consequences of action (Beckers, De 
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Houwer, & Eelen, 2002). Hence, it seems that we have good reasons to believe that external, 
remote action effects seem to become integrated with the responses that produce them. 
However, the evidence for the impact of action effects on behavior presented so far emerged 
primarily from experimental situations where action effects were presented prior to action 
execution. Such conditions are less representative for actual goal-directed actions. In a real- 
world scenario environmental effects always only follow action execution. The fact that the 
advance presentation of effects facilitates responding might be an artifact in the sense that 
response facilitation only occurs, and would thus be restricted to experimental settings where 
external stimuli provide effect-related information. Hence, it remains open whether effect 
codes are also activated in action planning if this external stimulation is not available. If we 
want to show that the anticipation of action effects (i.e. the activation of effect codes) is a 
constitutional part of action planning we need a paradigm in which effects are only presented 
after the action has been executed, but their anticipation, provided that it occurs, should affect 
the response times. 
To meet this requirement two experimental strategies have been pursued: Ziessler et al. 
(2006) developed a paradigm in which ´affordances´ (lawful relationships between object 
characteristics and movement parameters in the sense of Gibson, 1966, 1979) evoked by 
anticipated effects might interfere with action-related information conveyed by a stimulus 
being presented prior to action execution. The experiment consisted of an acquisition phase 
and a test phase. In the acquisition phase participants learned that left or right key-presses 
would produce a picture of a beach ball or of a steering wheel on the screen. On presentation 
of an “O“ participants were free to choose one of the two responses. 
Figure 2 
 
In the test phase participants were required to prepare a left response on presentation of a 
yellow square and a right response on presentation of a yellow triangle. However, they were 
instructed to withhold their responses until the appearance of two hands on the screen (GO 
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signal). The hand postures either corresponded with affordances inherent in the learned 
response effects or they did not (i.e., a catching-related hand posture would correspond with 
the action-directed potential of a beach ball but would not be suited to efficiently operate a 
car‟s steering wheel). Importantly, there was no relationship between the GO signal and the 
required response. As expected, Ziessler and colleagues found that the correspondence 
relation between the hand postures signaling action execution and inherent affordances of 
learned response effects affected performance. Responding was delayed when the GO signal 
indicated an action that was not related to the action-directing potential inherent in the learned 
response effects. To explain these results we have to assume that participants anticipated the 
effect of the required response (the steering wheel or the beach ball) in course of response 
planning. Only then, the relationship between the GO signal and the effect could affect 
response times. 
Further evidence showing that action effects really play a role in action control is provided by 
studies that demonstrate effects of the compatibility between responses and their effects (R-E 
compatibility effects). For instance, persons were shown to respond faster if the spatial 
locations of visual effect and response matched. That is, spatially specified actions are 
initiated faster when they reliably produce spatially compatible effects as compared to 
incompatible ones (spatial R-E compatibility effect; Hommel, 1993; Kunde, 2001). Similar R- 
E compatibility effects have been reported for intensity and velocity (Kunde, 2003; Kunde, 
Koch & Hoffmann, 2004). Spatial R–E compatibility effects are not confined to overlapping 
physical features of actions and their effects but extend well to situations where anticipated 
action effects refer to implicit, mentally generated spatial information (Nattkemper, Ziessler 
& Frensch, 2007). This conclusion emerged from studies where numbers were introduced as 
action effects. As Dehaene (1997) argues, the relative magnitude of numbers is spatially 
coded on a mental “number line”. Small numbers are allocated on the left, higher numbers on 
the right of the number line. In reaction time experiments this leads to a compatibility effect; 
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relatively small numbers are faster responded to by left responses, relatively larger numbers 
by right responses. This phenomenon became known as Spatial Numerical Association of 
Response Codes (or SNARC effect) (Dehaene, 1992, 1997; for a review see Fias & Fischer, 
2005). Surprisingly, Nattkemper and colleagues observed that not only responding to numbers 
but also producing numbers by key presses generated the SNARC-effect. Responses to visual 
features (color or shape) of objects were faster when the mapping of response keys to the 
numbers they produced was SNARC-compatible (i.e., when a left key-press produced 2 or 3 
as effect and a right key-press 7 or 8) than when it was incompatible (i.e., when the left key 
produced relatively large numbers and the right key relatively small numbers). In other words, 
response planning is facilitated if there is an overlap between spatial features of the response 
and (non-physical) spatial features of the effect. This adds convincing support to the notion 
that (1) effects of voluntary actions become anticipated during response production and (2) 
that anticipations of forthcoming effects have the power to interfere with the motor system. 
In both types of experiments described in this section the action effects itself could not prime 
the response. The effects were not physically present before the execution of the response. 
Nevertheless the compatibility between features of the effect and features of the GO signal in 
the first type of experiments and features of the responses in the second type of experiments 
affected the response time. These findings conclusively indicate that preparing a response 
must have involved the activation of response-effect codes at some point in the process of 
response production. More generally, we have good reasons to believe that anticipatory 
representations of intended and expected action effects are involved in action control. 
 
How do motor patterns get connected to cognitive codes 
representing the perceptual consequences of movements? 
 
Though the issue of action-effect learning has been studied quite extensively in recent years 
and empirical evidence in support of the ideomotor principle is steadily increasing, there are 
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at least two key questions that are still under debate. The first concerns the nature of the 
mechanisms that link voluntary motor actions with their intended and expected effects. As a 
simple learning mechanism one could assume an associative mechanism connecting action 
codes with codes representing a movement‟s (body-related and distal) consequences. In fact, 
that is the idea of a two-stage model proposed by Elsner and Hommel (2001) as a modern 
variant of Lotze‟s (1852) and Harless´s (1861 solution to the question of how motor patterns 
can be brought under intentional control. Elsner and Hommel proposed that action-effect 
learning has a very simple associative (Hebbian) basis and described action-effect binding as 
the result of automatic processes by which associations between “motor pattern(s)” activated 
in the “motor system” and representations of the movement‟s sensory effects in the “cognitive 
system” are established (Elsner & Hommel, 2001, p. 230). 
In the first stage of the Elsner & Hommel model, individuals are assumed to acquire 
associations between movement representations and representations of those events that 
frequently co-occur with the movements. At this stage, voluntary actions do not exist; only 
random movements produce various perceivable body-related and external effects, which are 
registered and associated with the motor patterns producing the movement, following the 
Hebbian principle that what fires together wires together. The result is a sensory-motor 
structure that integrates “codes of any perceptual consequence or effect of a given movement . 
. . with the motor neurons producing this movement and thus become its cognitive 
representation” (Hommel, 2009, p. 513). Once such a structure is acquired it can be used to 
access motor patterns to achieve desired goals: activating the perceptual part of the structure 
by imagining features of an intended action effect (goal) primes the motor means to bring 
these effects about. From now on action effects can be produced intentionally by activating 
the codes of desired effects, which then spread their activation to the associated motor codes 
via a reversal of the learned action-effect association. 
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This view on action-effect acquisition is based on observations from learning studies (Elsner 
 
& Hommel, 2001; see also Hommel, 1993, 1996) where participants first learned that their 
responses (different key-presses) would produce different effects (R1  low pitched tone, R2 
 high pitched tone). In a subsequent test phase they were asked to respond to the former 
effect tones, which were presented as imperative stimuli now. It turned out that an action was 
performed faster in response to a tone that it had previously produced (low pitched tone  
R1, high pitched tone  R2) than to a tone that had been produced by the alternative action 
(low  R2, high  R1) - hence, an acquisition-consistent mapping of tone and response 
allowed for faster responding in the test phase than an acquisition-inconsistent mapping. In a 
second set of Elsner and Hommel´s (2001) experiments response choice was free not only in 
the learning phase but in the test phase, too. Elsner and Hommel found that presenting action 
effects could bias the free choice of responses: participants more often selected the response 
that had preceded a particular tone in the acquisition phase (i.e., the acquisition-consistent 
response) than the alternative response (i.e., the acquisition-consistent response). 
These and related observations from brain-imaging studies (Elsner et al., 2002; Melcher, 
Weidema, Eenshuistra, Hommel, and Gruber, 2008 and studies on action-effect learning in 
children (Eenshuistra, Weidema, & Hommel, 2004) have provided ample evidence suggesting 
that it makes sense to assume that perceiving an action-effect sequence results in the 
integration of action-related and effect-related codes. However, what is less clear is on what 
sort of codes the hypothesized integration process operate. 
Elsner & Hommel (2004) argued that action-effect binding consists of an association between 
motor patterns activated in motor areas and cognitive codes representing the movement‟s 
sensory effects. Taken literally, this would suggest that overt execution of responses is a 
prerequisite for action-effect binding to occur. However, Ziessler & Nattkemper (2002) 
demonstrated that the overt execution of responses in the acquisition phase is not required to 
produce action-effect binding in a go/no-go paradigm and showed that action planning 
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processes are sufficient to produce binding between responses and their sensory 
consequences. 
Recently, Kühn, Elsner, Prinz, & Brass (2009) extended these findings by showing action- 
effect binding for what they called „intentional non-action‟. In their study participants had 
three freely chosen response options: for the acquisition phase they were instructed to decide 
on presentation of a visual Go-signal between pressing a left or right button (intentional 
action) and no button (intentional non-action). When participants overtly responded left and 
right button presses produced specific effect tones. When the no-button press option was 
chosen a third tone was presented as „non-action‟ effect (its presentation was determined with 
reference to the history of Rt‟s in button press trials). 
On the basis of the assumption that intentional non-actions resemble intentional actions in that 
they both involve a voluntary intention, Kühn et al. expected to find indications of action– 
effect binding. And this is what was found. Presenting action effects biased the free choice of 
responses: Participants more often selected the action or non-action that had preceded a 
particular tone in the acquisition phase (i.e., the acquisition-consistent response) than the 
alternative response (i.e., the acquisition-inconsistent response). In a second experiment 
action-effect binding for voluntary non-actions was demonstrated by means of Rt‟s in an 
induction paradigm: Participants had to perform a simple two-choice response task in the test 
phase. When the action-demanding stimuli appeared, irrelevant compatible or incompatible 
effect tones were presented and it was observed that compatible tones facilitated responding 
whereas tones associated with the other response as well as the tone associated with the non- 
action slowed down responding. 
Altogether, the data showing that action-effect binding can be observed in the absence of 
overt responses contradicts one way of reading the Elsner and Hommel approach to action- 
effect acquisition, namely that action execution is a necessary prerequisite for action-effect 
binding to occur. Rather, it seems that even higher level representations of actions and their 
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subsequent effects can be integrated suggesting that  action execution may be sufficient to 
create such bindings but it is not necessary. 
In an attempt to understand why action-effect binding can be observed even in the absence of 
overt responses, provided that action planning takes place, Ziessler and colleagues suggested 
that the mechanisms underlying action-effect acquisition may be tied to processing structures 
that serve action planning. In a nutshell, Ziessler, Nattkemper, and Frensch (2004) reasoned 
that action codes are not connected to the encountered effects but rather to the anticipated 
effects that constitute the motor intention. Preliminary evidence in support of this view 
emerged from a study, which showed that action-effect learning is subject to interference 
from a secondary task (Ziessler, Nattkemper & Frensch, 2004). In the primary task, the 
responses of participants to stimulus letters produced new stimulus letters as action effects. In 
addition to the stimuli of the forced choice reaction task, tones were presented at different 
points in time, either before responding (during action planning) or after response execution 
(but before the presentation of the action effect). Participants were either instructed to monitor 
the tones or to ignore them. When participants had to monitor the tones, they were asked to 
count the high-pitched tones and to indicate the calculated number after each block of trials. 
The critical question then was whether or not the presentation of the tones at different points 
in time would affect action-effect learning. 
 
If action-effect acquisition were based on associative mechanisms that automatically link 
responses with subsequent changes in the environment, the presentation of the distracting tone 
between response execution and the actual effect should impair effect learning. In this case 
the associative learning process would connect the response not only with the effect stimulus 
but also with the random tones. Overall, this should reduce the contingency between the 
response and the following events. By contrast, tones presented during response planning 
should not influence action-effect learning. The only perceptual event contingently following 
action execution was the effect letter, which should easily be accepted for integration. Hence, 
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following associative views of action-effect learning clear indications of effect learning 
should be obtained with tones being presented before action execution starts and reduced 
learning with tones being presented after action execution. 
Two observations emerged. Firstly, when counting tones was required action-effect learning 
was substantially reduced. This was independent from whether the tones were presented 
before or after action execution. Hence, it seems that the operations being in charge of the 
tone-counting task interfered with action-effect learning. This may indicate that action-effect 
learning requires cognitive resources and suffers from an overlapping task – a conclusion that 
does not necessarily speak against associative models of action-effect acquisition when one 
assumes that action-effect bindings need to be consolidated in order to affect subsequent 
behaviour. As memory consolidation is known to be resource demanding (Jolicour & 
Dell'Acqua, 1998), it may well be that it suffers from an overlapping task, such as tone 
counting. 
More conclusive with respect to the assumptions of associative models of action-effect 
acquisition is the second observation showing indications of action-effect learning when 
counting of tones was not required.  Interestingly, the amount of learning depended on 
whether the tones were presented before or after response execution. Large learning effects 
were found when tones occurred after response execution and minor effects when tones 
occurred before response execution. Hence, it seems that action-effect learning is vulnerable 
to disturbances arising in the planning phase of an action. 
 
Based on the findings that action planning processes may be sufficient to produce binding 
between responses and their sensory consequences Ziessler and colleagues questioned the 
assumption that action-related codes are bound to effect-related codes simply due to co- 
occurrence of both activation patterns and suggested that the binding between actions and 
their sensory effects is mediated by anticipating an action‟s effect during action planning. 
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With this view, action-effect binding emerges when the response is planned and the action- 
effect is actively anticipated. 
In an attempt to understand how action planning can contribute to action-effect acquisition 
Ziessler et al. (2004) have proposed a model that integrates components of the forward and 
inverse models of motor control (e.g. Frith, Blackmore, & Wolpert, 2000; Jordan, 1996; 
Wolpert, Miall, & Kawato, 1998). The crucial point of the model is that learning of action 
effects is not described as an association between movement patterns and effects in the 
environment. Rather, it is assumed that action-effect binding emerges in action planning when 




The model (c.f. Fig. 3) suggests to make a distinction between the desired effects and the 
anticipated effects. Depending on the environmental situation and the internal state, goals are 
set for the behavior. Thus, the goals are the desired effects of the to-be-planned behavior. 
Then the motor program is selected that is likely to achieve these goals. This process has been 
described in terms of inverse models. Based on the selected program, the cognitive system 
anticipates the effects that the program execution should cause in the environment in terms of 
forward models. Then the anticipated effect is compared with the desired effect. This allows 
for an internal test of the selected program. Differences between desired and anticipated 
effects cause modifications of the motor program. However, if the anticipated effects are in 
correspondence with the desired effects, then the selected motor program receives additional 
activation that facilitates its execution. Thus, the interaction between the inverse and the 
forward model provides a circuit that is important for internal testing of the planned behavior 
and to initiate the execution. Critical for the system is the learning of action effects. We 
assume that the system learns to anticipate the effects that will be produced by a prepared 
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motor program. The learning is controlled by the comparison between anticipated effects and 
the actual effects. Differences result in an adjustment of effect anticipation. 
As the model describes it, action-effect binding emerges in action planning when motor 
programs are linked to the effects that the program execution should cause in the 
environment. Hence, it is assumed that the binding between actions and their subsequent 
sensory effects is mediated by anticipating environmental effects during action planning. In a 
novel situation, the effect anticipations are abstract and are related to dimensions on which 
changes in the environment are likely to occur. Later, the anticipations will be specified as a 
function of prior experience. The model involves a step-by-step specification of effect 
anticipation, starting with rough and ending with specific expectations of particular effects. 
Thus, the main components for learning should be the action plan and the effects. As in the 
forward model, learning occurs when there is a difference between the anticipated effect as 
part of the action plan and the actual events in the environment and consists in an adaptation 
of the prediction processes. Action execution is not necessary for learning. From this point of 
view, action-effect learning is an integrated part of action planning, as it requires the 
anticipation of effects in course of action planning and a modification of action planning as an 
expression of learning. What follows is that action-effect learning should be intimately tied to 
processes involved in action planning. And this is what was found – action-effect learning 
was impaired when action planning was impaired. 
 
Based on the assumptions underlying the anticipative learning model Ziessler and colleagues 
raised the question for the selectivity of action-effect binding. More specifically, they argued 
that the anticipation of action-effects during action planning should bias the cognitive system 
to preferentially search for those events in the environment that are compatible with the 
expected events. Thus, it would come as no surprise that action-effect binding operates 
selectively depending on the actor‟s intention. 
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Preliminary evidence for this assumption stems from a study by Ziessler, Nattkemper, & 
Frensch (2004). In an initial acquisition phase, participants were presented with one of eight 
letters which were to be responded to with one of four button presses. These responses led to 
the presentation of one out of 8 possible effects each consisting of a letter not used as a 
stimulus and a digit. Neither S-R nor R-E associations were instructed beforehand, but 
emphasis was put on the fact that there was a systematic relationship between responses and 
effects, such that one group of participants was instructed to find out how to produce the 
digits while another group was instructed to find out how to produce the letters. To diagnose 
action-effect learning, both kinds of effects, i.e. letters as well as digits, were used as flankers 
in both instruction groups in the test phase of the experiment. The idea was to provide the 
opportunity to study the influence of intended and non-intended effects on the response to the 
targets. If response-effect learning is modulated by the actors´ intentions the impact of 
flankers from the instructed category of effects on action control should be different from the 
impact of flankers from the non-instructed category of effects. And this is what was observed 
(c.f. Fig. 4): While flankers from the non-instructed category of effects did not affect 
performance, effects of effect-compatibility emerged with flankers belonging to the instructed 
set of effects (faster responding with effect-compatible flankers than with effect-incompatible 
and neutral flankers). 
Thus, it may be concluded that only those flankers affected behavior in the test phase that 
belonged to the instructed category of action-effects while ignoring the information related to 
the non-intended effects. Although these data do not exclude that the non-instructed action- 
effects, too, played a role in the acquisition phase, they obviously indicate that the instructed 
action-effects were weighted more highly than the non-instructed. This led Ziessler and 
colleagues to conclude that the acquisition of action-effect structures is at least modulated by 
intention. 
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Recently, Herwig, Prinz and Waszak (2007; see also Herwig & Waszak, 2008) went one step 
further by showing that action-effect learning is not only modulated by but crucially depends 
on an agent‟s intention. Following neuroscientific evidence which suggests that intention- 
based actions (i.e., movements carried out in order to voluntarily produce desired 
environmental effects - mediated by fronto-striatalcircuits, including the dorso-lateral 
prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, and SMA) and stimulus-based actions (i.e., movements 
carried out to accommodate environmental demands - controlled by circuits involving PMA 
(lateral premotor cortex) and parietal areas) are controlled by different neural structures 
(Passingham, Toni, & Rushworth, 2000; Toni, Rushworth, & Passingham, 2001) and differ in 
behavioral indices, such as temporal attraction measures (Haggard, Aschersleben, Gehrke, & 
Prinz, 2002; Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002) and movement timing (Waszak, Wascher, 
Keller, Koch, Aschersleben, Rosenbaum, & Prinz, 2005; Keller, Wascher, Prinz, Waszak, 
Koch, & Rosenbaum, 2006), Herwig et al. speculated that action-effect learning only occurs 
when agents act in an intention-based action mode. To test this speculation, Herwig and 
colleagues replicated the Elsner and Hommel (2001) studies with different types of 
acquisition phases - an intention-based acquisition phase and different types of stimulus-based 
acquisition phase. Participants of the intention-based groups were required to freely select 
between two possible actions (corresponding to the Elsner & Hommel study). By contrast, the 
participants‟ actions were triggered by external stimulus events in the stimulus-based groups. 
However, in all groups the actions were contingently followed by certain effect tones. That is, 
in all groups participants performed identical movements (key presses with the index finger of 
the left or the right hand) which were immediately followed by effect tones (e.g., high- or 
low-pitched tones). The only difference between the groups was whether the actions were 
selected in an intention-based or in a stimulus-based mode of movement. Most interestingly, 
in the test-phase evidence for action-effect learning could only be found after intention-based 
acquisition. It was only in this group that an action was executed faster if triggered by a tone 
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that the action had previously produced than if triggered by a tone that had been produced by 
the alternative action. In contrast, after stimulus-based acquisition no indication of action- 
effect learning was obtained, i.e. the mapping of the former effect tones as imperative stimuli 
on the responses did not affect response times. 
When we, now, consider what follows from the findings reported so far it seems that action- 
effect binding may be more than linking action-related codes to effect-related codes simply 
due to the co-occurrence of both activation patterns. This may be the case when agents start 
learning a certain task with a tabula rasa concerning their action repertoire and concerning 
the effects that would accompany and follow certain actions (i.e., children, infants, and 
novices who acquire action effects in the first place). However, the agents that we usually 
study in experiments on action-effect learning do not start with an action tabula rasa but are 
equipped with a sophisticated action control machinery that reflects an individual‟s history of 
interacting with the world. Thus, it  is not surprising that action-effect learning (at least in 
expert actors like the participants in our experiments) can be more than simply exploiting the 
coincidence of movements and their sensory effects. The reported evidence suggests that 
contiguity and contingency between actions and effects seem to be necessary for action-effect 
learning to occur. However, an intention to produce a certain effect also seems to be sufficient 
for action-effect learning to occur, provided that the effect can be contingently produced by a 
certain action. For explanation it seems worthwhile to consider action-effect learning as a by- 
product of efficient action planning where features of intended and expected effects get bound 
to features of the actions that are selected to bring these effects about. This would fit very well 
to the findings showing that action-effect learning did occur when agents acted in an 
intention-based mode but not when they acted in a stimulus-based mode. According to 
 
Herwig et al., agents pass on control to the stimuli in the stimulus-based mode and the system 
merely acts upon presentation of a particular stimulus attribute in a pre-specified way (in the 
sense of a prepared reflex, Hommel, 2000). In this mode, the cognitive system is prepared 
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ahead of the stimulus by instruction (Wenke, Gaschler, & Nattkemper, 2007; Wenke, 
Gaschler, Nattkemper, and Frensch, 2009) and the participant‟s prior stimulus-response 
learning history which create representations that integrate or bind codes of the action- 
relevant stimulus attributes and the corresponding action codes (stimulus–response bindings ; 
see Allport, 1987; Logan, 1988; Hommel, Pösse, & Waszak, 2000; Waszak, Hommel, & 
Allport, 2003). If these bindings are stored in memory, they may serve to guide actions based 
on external stimulus events without requiring to plan actions in terms of their sensory 
consequences. By contrast, action-effect learning is boosted when actions are governed with 
respect to their sensory consequences. In this case, action planning involves anticipating the 
effects of a certain action. Anticipating the outcomes of executing a particular action may bias 
or pre-tune the perceptual system to search for and to identify the anticipated effects in the 
environment. Comparing encountered and expected sensory consequences then provides the 
opportunity to generate an error signal that may be used to update internal models that capture 
the relations between actions and their effects. . 
 
What are codes of action-effects used for? 
 
 
A second question that is under debate is the question for the functional role of effect-code 
activation in action production and control. Proponents of the ideo-motor approach to action 
control (Hommel et al., 2001, Kunde, 2003, Kunde et al., 2004) claim that performing an 
action leaves behind an association between the action‟s motor code and the sensory effects 
the action produces (action-effect bindings). By virtue of repeated experience this eventually 
results in creating a sensory-motor structure that integrates motor codes with codes of the 
perceptual events that represent action-effects. The associations between motor codes and 
perceptual codes are assumed to be bidirectional. Perceiving or imagining events that 
resemble learned action-effects will activate the perceptual part of the structure and will 
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finally prime or induce the motor patterns that have been learned to produce these events. Do 
effect-codes prime motor representations? 
At first sight the above sketched compatibility effects obtained with exogenously as well as 
endogenously activated effect codes seem to be consistent with the assumption that both 
perceived and anticipated events gain the power to induce actions. Further evidence has been 
provided by Elsner et al. (2002) and Melcher et al. (2008) who showed that the mere 
perception of auditory stimuli that previously had been presented as effect tones of certain 
actions results in the activation of neural structures that are selectively activated with 
voluntary but not stimulus-driven actions. Moreover, Kunde (2004) observed response 
priming by visual stimuli formerly presented as action effects although the prime stimuli were 
masked during the test phase and thus could not be consciously identified. 
Although these observations show that action  codes are activated when perceiving effect- 
related events, it is less clear whether the activation of effect  codes really is the prerequisite 
for accessing and selecting responses as considered in ideo-motor approaches. If this would 
be the case, one should be able to show that effect codes have access to relatively early phases 
of response production which can be equated with what traditional information-processing 
models label as “response selection”. Thus, effect-code activation should precede response 
selection, simply because codes of effects serve as mental cues for the selection of appropriate 
motor patterns. 
Until now there are only few studies that directly addressed the functional role and the locus 
of effect-code activation. Using the well-established PRP-paradigm (Pashler, 1984, 1994; 
Logan & Gordon, 2001) Paelecke and Kunde (2007) located the activation of effect codes 
relative to the stage that information-processing models denote as response selection stage. 
Their results suggest that endogenously activated effect codes affect the responses within or 
after the response bottleneck whereas exogenously activated effect codes had their impact 
before the stage of response selection. Thus, for endogenously activated effect codes (or if the 
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cognitive system is intention-based mode) it seems likely that effect codes affect response 
selection. However, if the effect codes are exogenously activated their impact on response 
time does not depend on response selection. 
These observations and their interpretation would be consistent with the claim that codes of 
action-effects serve as mental cues for the selection of appropriate motor patterns. However, 
results from another study point in another direction. Ziessler and Nattkemper (2009, under 
revision) adapted their flanker paradigm to investigate the involvement of effect codes in the 
preparation of motor responses.  Participants first worked through a learning phase where they 
responded to letters with key press actions that contingently produced new letters as effect 
stimuli. In a second phase, the effect letters or neutral letters were presented before, 
simultaneously with, or after the target letters as flanker stimuli. Depending on the acquired 
response-effect associations, effect flankers could be compatible or incompatible to the 
required response. The flanker-compatibility-effect served as indicator for an internal 
activation of effect codes. 
 
The results were not consistent with the idea that effect codes induce motor representations. 
 
the effect compatibility of the flankers did not affect responding when flankers were presented 
before target onset. This suggests that participants could not make use of the effect-related 
information as long as the response had not been determined by the stimulus. If this 
information was provided simultaneously with the target, effect-compatible flankers delayed 
responding while no costs of incompatible flankers were observed. If effect-related 
information was provided considerably after target onset, effect-compatible flankers 
facilitated responding compared to incompatible or neutral flankers. Moreover,  there was 
only a benefit of effect-compatible flankers but no cost of incompatible flankers. RTs under 
the effect-incompatible condition were almost identical to RTs under the neutral condition. 
What  was  observed  was  that  the  effect  compatibility of  the  flankers  did  not  affect  the 
responses to the targets if the flankers were presented before target onset. It seems that 
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participants cannot make use of the information about the particular effect as long as the 
response has not been determined by the stimulus. If this information was provided 
simultaneously with the target, effect-compatible flankers delayed responding while no costs 
of incompatible flankers were observed. If information about the effects was provided 
considerably after target onset, it facilitated the responses to the targets compared to wrong or 
neutral information. Moreover,  there was only a benefit of effect-compatible flankers but no 
cost of incompatible flankers. RTs under the effect-incompatible condition were almost 
identical to RTs under the neutral condition. 
These results indicate that advance information about the to-be-produced effects had little or 
no effect on response times. It seems that effect-related information presented before the 
target could not be used to activate or prime the response. This outcome is clearly not 
compatible with “strong” versions of the ideo-motor theory that state that perceiving events 
that resemble learned action-effects will prime or induce the motor patterns that have been 
learned  to  produce these events.  Furthermore,  no  difference between  neutral  and  effect- 
incompatible  flankers  was  found.  Only  the  effect-compatible  flankers  facilitated  the 
responses. In the framework of the ideomotor principle we should expect benefits for effect- 
compatible and costs for effect-incompatible flankers since both flanker types should activate 
the responses producing these effects. In case of effect-compatible flankers that would be the 
correct response. In case of effect-incompatible flankers that would be an incorrect response. 
Thus, the missing costs for effect-incompatible flankers are further evidence against the idea 
that the activation of effect codes would prime the response. 
In an effort to determine at what stages of response production action effects operate, 
Nikolaev, Ziessler, Dimova and van Leeuwen (2008) used high-density event-related 
potentials (ERP) in the flanker paradigm of Ziessler and Nattkemper. The analysis of the EEG 
data aimed at two kinds of brain activity: (1) activity evoked by the presentation of the effect- 
related flankers averaged relative to their onset and (2) activity related to the selection and 
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preparation of a motor response using lateralized readiness potentials (LRP) as a measure of 
covert motor preparation. What was found was (1) that ERP‟s evoked by effect-incompatible 
flankers differed from those evoked by other flankers in the early perceptual component P1 
and in a later frontal component P2, which are supposed to reflect stimulus evalution and 
conflict detection, respectively. Most interestingly in the present context, Nikolaev and 
colleagues found (2) that effects of flanker-compatibility were not observed in the stimulus- 
locked LRP, which was taken as evidence that effect-related flankers did not modulate motor 
preparation stages. By contrast, flanker-compatibility effects were observed in the response- 
locked LRPs, i.e. the interval between LRP onset and the overt response was affected by 
effect-compatibility of the flanker. This interval is thought to sensitively reflect the duration 
of motor processes following response selection. It was found that the time needed for 
executing a motor response was longer with effect-incompatible than with the other flankers. 
Thus, it seems that incompatible flankers delayed the execution of the response at a point in 
time at which the motor program had already been prepared. 
Altogether, it seems that analyzing the type and distribution of ERP‟s gives us important hints 
about the function of effect anticipation in action planning. Effects of the effect-compatibility 
of flanker stimuli were observed in the perceptual peak P1, and in the later peak P2 reflecting 
conflict detection. These findings provide evidence that anticipated action-effects prepare 
cognitive and perceptual processes for the immediate consequences of an action. Information 
about these consequences is likely to reach the perceptual system in a top-down fashion in 
that the perceptual system, as result of response preparation, is biased to search for the 
anticipated action consequences in the environment. As indicated by the effects on the LRP- 
component, anticipated action-effects also influenced motor processes. Interestingly, 
however, it seems that effect-incompatible flankers did not affect pre-motor processes related 
to response preparation but motor processes that come into play after having prepared a 
certain response. 
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In summary, the functional role that  effect-codes play in action planning is far from being 
understood. Facing the discrepancies between the reported results it seems that both further 
theorizing and further experimenting is required to understand what effect-codes are used for 





After Wolfgang Prinz in the 1980s revived and elaborated the idea that actions are controlled 
by anticipatory activations of representations of intended and expected action-effects, we have 
seen a proliferation of studies that show indeed that the cognitive system links voluntary 
actions with their perceptual effects. Thus, the issue that seems to be settled is that action 
effects are integrated and used in the control of voluntary actions. Some questions certainly 
remain, such as how sophisticated the principles underlying action-effect integration are, how 
intention and attention shape the integration and/or use of effect codes, and what the 
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Fig. 1: Basic procedure and main result of the Ziessler & Nattkemper (2002) study. C, N, and I in the right -side 
graph refer to the effect-compatible, neutral, and effect-incompatible flanker condition. 
 
Fig 2: Illustration of the basic procedure of the Ziessler et al. (2006) study. 
 
 
Fig. 3: Illustration of the anticipative action-effect learning model of Ziessler et al. (2004). 
 
 
Fig. 4: Effects of effect-compatibility depending on whether the flanker was chosen from the instructed or the 
non-instructed category of effect stimuli. The figure shows the mean RTs to targets depending on whether the 
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